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    ABSTRACT 
 
This paper traces the developments that have contributed to the importance of risk in 
regulation. Not only does it consider theories associated with risk, it also discusses 
explanations as to why risk has become so important within regulatory and governmental 
circles. Two forms of risk regulation, namely risk based regulation and meta regulation are 
considered. As well as considering the application of both in jurisdictions such as the UK, the 
paper places greater focus in discussing the importance of meta regulation in jurisdictions 
such as Germany, Italy and the US. The preference for meta regulation is based on the 
premises, not only of the advantages considered in this paper but also on the application of 
Basel 11 in several jurisdictions. Whilst meta regulation also has its disadvantages, the 
impact of risk based regulation on the use of external auditors plays a part in the preference 
for meta regulation. 
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THE GROWING IMPORTANCE OF RISK IN FINANCIAL REGULATION 
 
 
 
Ulrich Beck’s book, illustrates the fact that societies have become more reflexive about risk.1 In many 
countries, even though there has been growing formalisation in that the regulatory and supervisory 
process is more statute and rules-based, emphasis has shifted not only from rules to risks, but also to 
management responsibilities. Regulation is often perceived as consisting of command and control 
strategies whereby the regulator imposes detailed rules with which the regulator monitors compliance.2 
However, meta regulation is a type of regulatory strategy which draws firms into regulatory processes 
and attempts to both influence and make use of firms internal risk management and control strategies3 
As a result, supervision is not so much about the simple monitoring of firms' compliance with 
regulatory rules but more about evaluating and monitoring firms' awareness of the risks created by 
their business and of their internal controls.4 
 
 
In most countries however, different rules are applied to different types of financial businesses and 
these indicate the sectoral differences which exist in central business activities and risk exposures of 
these businesses.5 As an illustration, credit risk is the dominating risk for banking institutions since 
loans constitute the major share of assets which are typically known to exist within a bank.6 Even 
though balance sheets of individual bank institutions reveal differences, lending activities constitutes 
the core of the commercial banking business.7 Other classes of risk which are connected to the general 
business of commercial banking include liquidity and other market risks.  
 
Meta regulation can be described as the regulation of self-regulation.8 Meta risk regulation concerns 
the management of internal risk and being able to use the firms' own internal risk management systems 
to achieve regulatory objectives.9 The Basel II Capital Accord provides an example of the operation of 
meta regulation in that bank capitalisation is not to be imposed externally by regulators but will be 
determined by a bank's own internal risk management models provided these models are considered 
by regulators to be adequate.10 One major advantage of meta-risk regulation is that it should enable the 
regulator exploit the expertise of the industry in an age when the complexity and volatility of modern 
risk calls into question the ability of financial regulators to stay one step ahead.11 Another advantage of 
meta regulation is that it not only provides greater means of overcoming challenges associated with 
regulation, but also those problems of rigidity resulting from too many prescriptive rules.12 
 
Two well-known theoretical perspectives addressing the different explanations for why risk has 
                                                 
1  U Beck Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity 1992 Beverly Hills Sage 
2  J Gray and J Hamilton,  Implementing Financial Regulation : Theory and Practice  (2006)  36 
3 ibid 
4 ibid 
5  See 'Supervision of Financial Services in the OECD Area' pg 4 < 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/29/27/1939320.pdf> 
6  ibid 
7  ibid 
8  The last but one chapter of Christine Parker’s book, The Open Corporation: Self Regulation and Corporate 
Citizenship, provides this title. The theme of meta regulation was developed by Peter Grabosky, where he 
refers to “meta-monitoring” as government monitoring of self-monitoring. See J Braithwaite, ‘Meta Risk 
Management and Responsive Governance’ Paper to Risk Regulation, Accountability and Development 
Conference, University of Manchester, 26-27 June 2003 
9 J Gray and J Hamilton,  Implementing Financial Regulation : Theory and Practice  (2006) 37 
10 ibid 
11  ibid 
12  F Haines,‘Regulatory Failures and Regulatory Solutions: A Characteristic Analysis of the Aftermath of 
Disaster’, Law and Social Inquiry ( 2009) 39 (forthcoming) 
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become central, are termed “risk society” theory and “governmentality” theory.13 The “risk society” 
approach is one that identifies broad socio-economic and political changes which occurred in late 
modern societies. Along with these changes, loss of faith in institutions and authorities and a greater 
awareness of the limits and uncertainties linked to science and technology are identified.14 The term 
“governmentality” refers to specific types of government that have arisen in modern societies in line 
with liberalist and neo-liberalist approaches.15 It focuses on the exploration of how the identification of 
risks associated with certain behaviour or activities provide a way of exercising control over 
populations, groups or individuals in neo-liberal societies – in other words, identifying how risk is 
used as a “tool of governance” to shape behaviours.16 
 
 
Liberalisation and Conglomeration 
 
In the liberalisation process of the 60s, 70s and early 80s, the most substantive reforms in financial 
services involved inter alia, the removal of controls on interest rates. A number of factors played their 
part in the early period of liberalisation namely: the blurring of the financial pillars – institutions 
carrying out banking activities pursuing activities which depended on investment dealers; financial 
innovation ; technological developments; macro-economic developments which facilitated a more 
flexible financial system and a need for a more competitive environment.17 
 
Ultimate liberalisation occurred since countries and their financial institutions realised that they were 
at a competitive disadvantage – as globalisation gained momentum. Regulators were not able to 
maximise their potential to regulate during the emergence of globalisation because they did not have 
the facility to adequately challenge the anti-competitive behaviour of the financial services industry. 
This was partly due to the asymmetric distribution of information between the industry being regulated 
and the primary regulator. This was notable in North America, the UK and Japan. In Germany and 
France where the financial sector was dominated by state ownership, the issue of asymmetry was not 
as important since banks were the dominant institutions in these countries – due to their universal bank 
structure.18  
 
 
The decline of traditional banking, which has led many banks to venture into more profitable activities 
and the undermining of the role of banks, which resulted from commercial and industrial companies 
raising funds directly from markets, has also contributed to the blurring distinction between financial 
intermediaries.19 In Germany, the desire to provide a wide range of products corresponding with the 
concept of All finanz20 led to large banks adopting various strategies to enter the insurance sector.21 
The Deutsche Bank, for instance, established its own life subsidiary, Dresdner Bank and embarked on 
establishing alliance with insurance companies such as Allianz.22 Commerzbank has also taken up a 
joint venture strategy.23 In the UK, building societies provided life insurance-based endowment 
mortgage, a key product in the sector.24 The mid 80s also saw the commencement of active sale of life 
insurance products produced by subsidiaries or allied companies of large clearing banks through their 
                                                 
13  Gray and Hamilton at page  6 
14  ibid 
15  ibid at page 9 
16  ibid 
17 For more on this, see The OECD Report on Regulatory Reform 1997 Volume 1: Sectoral Studies  72 - 76 
18  See The OECD Report on Regulatory Reform 1997 Volume 1: Sectoral Studies  73-74 
19 T Filipova  Concept  of  Integrated Financial  Supervision  and  Regulation  of Financial Conglomerates : 
The Case of  Germany and the UK  (Nomos 2007) 39 
20 For more on the All-Finance concept, see E Boehmer 'Who Controls Germany? An Explanatory Analysis' 
Institut fuer Handels und Wirtschaeftsrecht, Universitaet Osnabrueck, Arbeitspaper Nr 71 (1998); Deutsche 
Bundesbank, Die Aufsicht ueber Finanzkonglomerate in Deutschland, Monatsbericht, (April 2005)  43-48 
21 K Koguchi, 'Financial Conglomeration', Financial Conglomerates  (1993) OECD 11 
22 ibid 
23 ibid 
24 ibid 
 4
vast networks.25 In the 1990s, financial conglomerates already controlled a large market share and 
currently have 28% of bank deposits and 46% of the total insurance income in Britain.26  
 
In the US, separation between banking and securities business as established by the Glass Steagall Act, 
has not only been gradually relaxed by allowing interpretations of the Act by the Federal Reserve 
Board, and other banking regulators through the 1980s, but has also been superseded by the Gramm 
Leach Bliley Act.27 The Gramm Leach Bliley Act removed the distinction between commercial banks 
and securities business. The early development of financial conglomerates which was restricted due to 
the functional separation of commercial banks and securities business resulted not only from the 1933 
Glass Steagall Act but also from the National Bank Act of 1984, restrictions on branch banking 
imposed under the McFadden Act of 1927.28 Separation of banking from other commercial activities 
hindered the competitiveness of US banks on the international market scene and made it difficult for 
some non US financial groups to gain access to the US market.29 If such a group consisted of both 
bank and insurance companies, it could participate either in the banking or the insurance business.30 
 
 
The need for a single regulator which regulates not just the banking sector, but also the insurance and 
securities sectors, has arisen principally because of the rise of conglomerate firms. Single regulators 
are able to manage more effectively cross sector services' risks. The adoption of the principle of 
consolidated supervision has enabled supervisors to assess more adequately the overall strength of a 
banking organisation and to monitor its susceptibility to risks based on the totality of its business, 
wherever conducted.31 Moreover, bank collapses such as BCCI revealed that consolidation into a 
single entity was important for purposes of regulating a bank.  Correspondingly, the functional 
overlaps between banking, insurance and securities business and their universal scope make it more 
difficult for a regulator to observe and comprehend such businesses.32 The difficulty of measuring and 
assessing risk within such institutions along with the speed with which assets can be adjusted in 
derivatives markets has led to more emphasis being placed on internal managerial control. 33 
Consideration is also being given to the structures that can be put in place to re inforce the incentives 
of all parties involved – not just to management but all parties including auditors and regulators.34 
 
Following the “Big Bang” in 1986, most of the leading stock exchange member firms were bought by 
UK merchant or clearing banks, overseas commercial or investment banks. This started the trend 
developing to the growth of financial conglomerates.35 
                                                 
25 The creation of the EC single financial market has accelerated the process of conglomeration of financial 
institutions in Europe. The implementation of the Second Banking Directive and the Investment Services 
Directive allows institutions holding licences from any EC member state to engage in banking or investment 
services  and to offer them throughout the Community; ibid 
26 T Filipova 2007 p 48; Examples of collaborative forces between banks and insurance companies are those 
between Lloyds TBS/Scottish Widows, Prudential Insurance Company/M6G/EGG, AXA/Woolwich, 
AXA/Bank of Scotland, Zurich/Bank of Scotland, CGNU/Royal Bank of Scotland, Legal and 
General/Alliance and Leicester, Legal and General/ Barclays. 
27 In 1990, the Federal Reserve Board authorised, subject to certain conditions, four US banks to underwrite 
corporate equities ; ibid pp 12 and 13; also see RM Lastra  Legal Foundations of International Financial 
Stability 2006 Oxford University Press  See forward by Charles Goodhart on page vii 
28 T Filipova 2007 p 49 
29 ibid 
30 M Gruson 'Foreign Banks and the Regulation of Financial Holding Companies' p 4 
31 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, ‘Trends in Banking Structure and Regulation in 
OECD Countries’ 1987 at p 14 
32 CAE Goodhart,  (ed)  'The Emerging Framework of Financial Regulation   ( Central Banking Publications 
Ltd  London 1998) 95-96 
33 ibid 
34 ibid 
35 See DH Scott  ' The Regulation and Supervision of Domestic Financial Conglomerates'  August 1994 The 
World Bank Financial Sector Development Department Policy Research Working Paper  No 1329  
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Another contributory factor to conglomeration arises from the change in demographic structure and 
increased income in the OECD countries as public pension systems face pressure as a result of aging 
population.36 As a result, individuals with higher income have resorted to investing in additional 
pension schemes and other investment means to ensure security of their living standards after 
retirement.37 Insurance companies have responded to these changes in the environment by placing 
more emphasis on those products with savings or investment character and less emphasis on those 
products of an “income protection” character such as annuities and pensions.38 
 
Factors such as the growth of financial conglomerates and the derivatives markets fuelled by the 
impact of information technology and increased competition have triggered a change in the way 
supervision is carried out around the globe. In addition, bank collapses have also contributed to a re-
think in the structure of financial regulation, that is, the way in which financial regulation is carried 
out. Developments in the 1980s considerably blurred earlier distinctions between product and 
institutional structures and various financial services have become closer substitutes for each other.39 
As traditional lines of demarcation between product and institutional structures became increasingly 
blurred, financial institutions also became exposed to new forms of competition.40 As a result of this 
resulting scope for competition, there was an awareness by financial intermediaries of the need to re-
assess their overall business strategies in order to cope with changing demands of their clients, as well 
as seeking new profitable ventures.41 These events contributed to the growth of financial 
conglomerates.  
 
Importance of Risk 
Different explanations have been given as to why risk has become central across regulatory and 
governmental circles and these explanations are partly influenced by different approaches as to what 
risk is.42 One view in attempting to account for risk as a strategic organising principle in the public 
sector, attributes the specific needs of government.43 Political scientists, however suggest that the 
adoption of the language and practices of risk reflects a deeper, more complex process, one of 
“political isomorphism”.44 According to this view, risk becomes accepted and embedded in one 
organisation or institution such that it acquires recognition within other organisations and 
institutions.45 Other explanations, mainly from socio-cultural disciplines suggests that the importance 
of risk derives from issues related to control, accountability, responsibility and blame in late modern 
society.46 
 
 
Historically, systemic risk was considered to be more relevant for banks generally, and for large banks 
particularly than for non-bank financial institutions.47 The Basle Committee’s Core Principles48 states  
                                                 
36 T Filipova  Concept  of  Integrated Financial  Supervision  and  Regulation  of Financial Conglomerates : 
The Case of  Germany and the UK  (Nomos 2007)  38 
37 ibid 
38 ibid 
39 K Koguchi, 'Financial Conglomeration', Financial Conglomerates  [1993] OECD 7  
40 ibid 
41 ibid 
42  J Gray and  J Hamilton  Implementing Financial Regulation ( 2006) at page 5 
43  ibid 
44  ibid 
45  ibid 
46  ibid 
47  See 'Supervision of Financial Services in the OECD Area' page 5 < 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/29/27/1939320.pdf> 
48  'Core Principles For Effective Banking Supervision' October 2006; See 
<http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs129.pdf> (last visited 11th July 2008) 
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that the primary task of bank supervision is “ to ensure that banks operate in a safe and sound manner 
and that they hold capital reserves sufficient to support risks that arise in their business”. According to 
the drafters of the Basel Core Principles, “Banking, by its nature, entails a wide array of risks. Banking 
supervisors need to understand these risks and be satisfied that banks are adequately measuring and 
managing them.”49 The Core Principles attempt to address the main risks encountered by banks in 
Principle Six which states that banking supervisors should set prudent and appropriate minimum 
capital adequacy requirements for all banks.50  
The focus on risks by the Basel Core Principles is illustrated by the number of principles dedicated to 
risk related issues. 
 
Principle 12 – Country and transfer risks: Supervisors must be satisfied that banks have adequate 
policies and processes for identifying, measuring, monitoring and controlling country risk and transfer 
risk in their international lending and investment activities, and for maintaining adequate provisions 
and reserves against such risks.  
Principle 13 – Market risks: Supervisors must be satisfied that banks have in place policies and 
processes that accurately identify, measure, monitor and control market risks; supervisors should have 
powers to impose specific limits and/or a specific capital charge on market risk exposures, if 
warranted.  
Principle 14 – Liquidity risk: Supervisors must be satisfied that banks have a liquidity management 
strategy that takes into account the risk profile of the institution, with prudent policies and processes to 
identify, measure, monitor and control liquidity risk, and to manage liquidity on a day-to-day basis. 
Supervisors require banks to have contingency plans for handling liquidity problems.  
Principle 15 – Operational risk: Supervisors must be satisfied that banks have in place risk 
management policies and processes to identify, assess, monitor and control/mitigate operational risk. 
These policies and processes should be commensurate with the size and complexity of the bank.  
Principle 16 – Interest rate risk in the banking book: Supervisors must be satisfied that banks have 
effective systems in place to identify, measure, monitor and control interest rate risk in the banking 
book, including a well defined strategy that has been approved by the Board and implemented by 
senior management; these should be appropriate to the size and complexity of such risk. 
 
As stated earlier, over the years, there has been a growing number of large, internationally active 
financial groups which operate in several financial sectors. Financial convergence has assumed a 
number of different forms. As well as cross sectoral investments and cross distribution, convergence is 
also taking place through cross sector risk transfers.51 Commercial banks, along with their investment 
and securities branches, have become users of products such as credit derivatives and other hedging 
instruments which are used as means of off-loading specific credit risk exposures.52 As revealed by 
data from the US Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, end-sellers of credit risk protection are 
usually large commercial banks, insurance companies, collateral managers of collateralized bond 
obligations, pension funds and mutual funds.53 Whilst commercial banks, hedge funds and to lesser 
extent non-financial companies, appear to be end buyers, banks and securities firms function as 
intermediaries – it is not possible to distinguish banks’ participation as intermediaries from their direct 
involvement as end-buyers or sellers.54 However, according to the Bank of England’s Financial 
Stability Review, is seems on average, that credit risk is being transferred from the banking sector to 
insurance companies and investment funds, mainly through portfolio transactions.55 
 
                                                 
49 D Quiroz Rendon, ' The Formal Regulatory Approach to Banking Regulation' Badell & Grau Legal 
Consultants, see <http://www.badellgrau.com/legalbanking.html> (last visited 10 June 2008) pg 10 of 26 
50 ibid pp 10,11 
51  See 'Supervision of Financial Services in the OECD Area' page 8 < 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/29/27/1939320.pdf> 
52  ibid 
53  ibid 
54  ibid 
55  ibid 
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As a result, new forms of risk have accompanied the changes in relation to financial structures, which 
have taken place over the years. Whilst individual entities could appear risky and the entire 
organization well-diversified or hedged, risks which did not appear at the level of individual entities 
could exist at the group level.56 Risks identified with integrated financial services groups include lack 
of transparency owing to complex intra-group exposures, the risk of contagion as a result of non-
existent or ineffective firewalls, multiple gearing risk, problems emanating from unregulated group 
members, the possibility of regulatory arbitrage occurring within financial services groups which 
involve more than one type of institution.57 
 
The Impact of Risk-Based Regulation as a  “tool of governance” on Behaviors of Regulators in 
the UK, Germany, Italy and the US. 
The supervision and monitoring of management performance and ensuring accountability of 
management to shareholders and other stakeholders constitute the two key aspects of corporate 
governance.58 
 
The UK 
Whilst the contested nature of risk, the values attached to it, and the likelihood of different 
interpretative frameworks have raised questions about the ability of risk to carry the weight of 
expectations attached to its as a regulatory tool59, relating risks to its objectives enables the FSA to 
establish a boundary around its regulatory role.60  
Impact of Risk-Based Supervision 
With the FSA under its risk-based approach dedicating more resources to the supervision of insurers, 
the extent of the involvement of external auditors in the supervision process is of considerable 
interest.61 
Overall, the FSA's risk based approach has led to a reduced role for auditors in banking supervision.62 
Since the date of implementation of the FSMA known as N2,63 there have been 84 skilled person 
reports of which the Enforcement Division has initiated only six.64 From 1 April 2003 to 31 March 
2004, the FSA exercised its power under section 166 of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 
to require firms to produce a skilled person's report in 28 situations.65 This figure dropped to 17 in 
2005/06 and 18 in 2006/07.66 This is a considerable reduction in investigations from the number of 
reporting accountants commissioned under section 39 Banking Act 1987 which frequently exceeded 
600 reports annually.67 
 
Impact of Meta Regulation 
Legal and General Assurance Society v FSA highlighted how the more holistic focus which meta 
regulation has on systemic failures on the part of firms, rather than their specific acts or omissions, is 
                                                 
56  ibid pg 6 
57  ibid at pg 9 
58 V Beattie, S Fearnley and R Brandt ‘Behind Closed Doors: What Company Audit is Really About’ (Institute 
of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales) 26 
59  J Gray and J Hamilton, Implementing Financial Regulation, pg 20 
60  ibid at page 30 
61 P Dewing and P O Russell, The Role of Auditors, Reporting Accountants and Skilled Persons in UK 
Financial Services Supervision  Institute  of Chartered Accountants of Scotland  (2005) 118 
62 P Dewing and P O Russell  at p 107 
63 December 1 2001 
64 See M Blair and G Walker, Financial Services Law (2006)136 and  
<http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/other/enf_process_review_report.pdf> pg 35 
65 ibid 
66 FSA Annual Report 2006/07 at page 162 
67 Blair and Walker, page 35 
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starting to influence the ways of approaching issues of causation in the framework of regulatory 
responsibility. 
 
In contrast to the FSA’s use of holistic approaches, to fact finding to establish regulatory responsibility 
and the Tribunal’s acknowledgement in Legal and General Assurance Society v FSA, of the need to do 
so, in Lloyds TSB General Insurance Holdings Ltd and others v Lloyds Bank Group Insurance Co Ltd, 
the House of Lords warned against the acceptability of using an overly holistic approach to 
establishing the “cause” of regulatory responsibility for the purposes of determining civil liability as 
between the insured and insurer under an insurance contract. 
 
The Financial Services Authority operates on a risk-based approach whereby it differentiates between 
regulated institutions and allocates resources to areas of greater perceived risk.68  It identifies three 
sources of risk namely:69 The external environment ; consumer and industry-wide risks and the 
regulated institutions themselves. The risk-based approach operates on two levels: at an organisation 
level, and at the firm level which is articulated in the ‘firm risk assessment framework’70 Referred to 
as the ARROW framework (Advanced Risk-Responsive Operating Framework) by the FSA and its 
staff, the approach is not focused on compliance with the prudential requirements that exist within the 
Interim Prudential Source Book or the Handbook Guidelines, but encapsulates risks that exist 
externally and internally in the financial services industry.71 It takes into specific consideration the 
interests of wider stakeholders such depositors, investors and other financial intermediaries, as well as 
its own interests and compliance with its statutory objectives and principles.72 
The FSA, being a risk-based regulator, has to make difficult choices about how it deploys its 
enforcement resources, as with its other resources.73 A consequence of its risk-based approach is that 
more of its supervisory resources will be devoted to its supervision priorities and, within this 
framework, to the larger financial firms and groups.74 
When firms are contacted by the FSA, they automatically assume that, because they have been 
selected, it means that the FSA has already decided that there is a problem in that firm - which is not 
the case.75 The decision to select a firm takes into account a number of factors such as the number and 
type of firms which are active in the market or product that the FSA is interested in; the desire to find 
a sample of firms that is representative of the various different sizes or structures in the market the 
FSA is considering; the desire to create a representative sample which includes some firms which the 
FSA considers are likely to set the highest standards in terms of systems and controls and practices in 
that area.76 The sample may also include some firms about whose practices the FSA has concerns and 
how the FSA can most efficiently use its resources to obtain sufficiently information for its needs.77 
The combination of more resources being committed to priority areas and the application of the FSA's 
risk-based approach to enforcement may give rise to an external perception of unfairness or ‘rough 
justice’.78 Any firm which believes its standards to have been no different to those of its peers may be 
                                                 
68 See J Hitchins M Hogg and D Mallett,  Banking : A Regulatory Accounting and Auditing Guide (Institute of 
Chartered Accountants 2001)120,121. In January 2000, the FSA announced its adoption of risk as a driver 
for its “business”, see J Gray and  J Hamilton 'Implementing Financial Regulation'  2006 p 25. There are 
however questions surrounding the suitability of risk as a capable regulatory tool due to its contested nature. 
69 Ibid  p 121 
70 FSA (2000) A New Regulator for the New Millennium, January; FSA (2000) Building the New Regulator: 
Progress Report 1, December; FSA (2002) Building the New Regulator: Progress Report 2, February; FSA 
(2003) The Firm Risk Assessment Framework, February. 
71  FSA Progress Report 1, ibid., at p. 8. 
72 FSA Progress Report 1, ibid., at p. 8 
73  <http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/other/enf_process_review_report.pdf> at page 18 
74 ibid 
75 ibid p 19 
76 ibid 
77 ibid 
78 ibid p 20 
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aggrieved if enforcement actions are imposed on it while its peers are not sanctioned.79 
The approach taken by the risk supervisory process to flesh out decisions and show how they are 
arrived at as regards resource allocation between different sectors of the financial services industry 
improves transparency and thereby provides a form of accountability mechanism as government can 
gauge how efficiently the FSA is utilising its resources to achieve its objectives.80 
 
It is important to distinguish between risk and uncertainty.81  Risk is traditionally associated with 
probability calculation and this suggests that an event can be predicted and controlled.82 Uncertainty 
however is not capable of measurement and deals with possibilities incapable of calculation which are 
based on guesswork and judgment.83 
There are four elements to the FSA's response to risk namely :84 (i) Diagnostic : To identify, assess 
and measure risks ; (ii) Monitoring : To track the development of identified risks; (iii) Preventative : 
To limit or reduce identified risks and prevent them from crystallising or increasing and (iv) Remedial 
: To respond to risks when they have crystallized. Six principal regulatory tools in this response are as 
follows :85 An authorisation process – led by the Threshold Conditions for authorisation; The 
approval of individuals – applying fit and proper person criteria; Supervision -where the regulators 
monitor authorised business; Enforcement – of the regulatory rules and penalising transgressors; 
Publicity – highlighting areas of concern to the industry and consumers and Education – Forewarning 
or forearming investors. 
The FSA states in its risk assessment framework that it functions to measure firm risks differently to 
the way firms normally manage risk.86 The FSA's operating framework has also been designed to link 
its statutory objectives with its regulatory activities.. 87  Risk, in particular risk to its four statutory 
objectives, is now used as the determinant for all regulatory activity, including overall strategy and 
development.88 It has the following stages :89 
 
– Identifying the risks to the statutory objectives 
– Assessing and then prioritising the risks : The FSA will first assess the effect of the collapse or 
lapse of conduct of a firm on the industry as a whole, on public perception and market confidence 
and on retail consumers, considering the availability of compensation or redress for them. 
– It will then consider the probability of a problem occurring by considering factors such as business 
risk, external context and the firm's business strategy and decisions. 
–  The FSA then prioritises its regulatory position by “multiplying” the impact of the problem (if it 
occurs) by the probability of the problem occurring.90 
                                                 
79 ibid 
80 D Singh, 'Legal Aspects of Prudential Supervision' 2007 at p 90 
81 J Gray and J Hamilton,  Implementing Financial Regulation: Theory and Practice  (2006) 20 
82 ibid 
83 ibid 
84  J Hitchins M Hogg and D Mallett p 121 
85 See J Hitchins M Hogg and D Mallett,  Banking : A Regulatory Accounting and Auditing Guide (Institute of 
Chartered Accountants 2001)  121 
86  FSA (2003) at p 12. 
87 See J  Hitchins M Hogg and D Mallett,  Banking : A Regulatory Accounting and Auditing Guide (Institute of 
Chartered Accountants  2001)123; The FSA refers to the risk-based approach as a ‘bridge linking the 
statutory objectives and our regulatory activities’ see FSA A New Regulator at p 14. 
88 J Gray and  J Hamilton,  Implementing Financial Regulation  (2006) 25 
89   J  Hitchins M Hogg and D Mallett  pp 123-124 
90  ibid; Banking : A Regulatory Accounting and Auditing Guide  (Institute of Chartered Accountants 2001) 
124; in doing this it takes into account (i) Its confidence in the information on which the risk assessment is 
based; (ii) The quality of home country supervision – for overseas banks in the UK and (iii) The anticipated 
direction of change in the impact and probability gradings. 
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– Having completed these assessments, the FSA, taking into account the resources at its disposal, 
will decide on its regulatory response. 
Reasons for the FSA's risk based framework relate to uncertainty not only from the challenges of 
regulation but  an increasingly complex and global financial environment, public expectation that the 
regulator would clean up the industry and by political demands for a safe but innovative and globally 
competitive industry.91 It is quite implicit in any risk-based regime with limited resources that priority 
will be given to the greatest risks – hence not all risks will be addressed.92 Relating risks to its 
objectives also enables the FSA to establish a boundary around its regulatory role.93 This boundary 
allows it to justify the exclusion or limitation of other roles such as that of regulating for distributive 
goals.94 
Firms remain the main focus of regulatory activity and as a result, immense attention is given to 
identifying the risks-to-objectives that they might pose.95 This process involves an assessment of the 
impact that a firm's failure or lapse of perspective will have on the FSA's objectives.96 The scoring 
process is mainly based on balance sheet information supplied by the firm and on this basis firms are 
scored into one of four categories: low, medium-low, medium-high, high.97 Generally, low impact 
firms will not be subject to a full risk assessment and will receive less intensive monitoring.98 
Just as risk is used as a technology of governance in relation to firms, it is also used in relation to 
consumers – in particular, to private citizen consumers of financial services.99 At first instance, the 
specific statutory objective to achieve “an appropriate degree of protection for the consumer” suggests 
that the regulator should take a proactive, protectionist role – however, this statutory objective is 
governed by statutory principles which require the FSA to recognise the different types of risks 
involved in different transactions as well as the general principle that consumers should take 
responsibility for their own decisions (“caveat emptor”).100 
The FSA has identified four principal risks that consumers may face namely: prudential risk, bad faith 
risk; complexity/unsuitability risk and performance risk.101 It has also made it clear that in pursuing a 
risk-to-objectives approach it will not guarantee a zero-failure regime.102 
 
Germany 
Risk-Based Regulation and Supervision in Germany 
The importance of risk-related information as a vital component of companies' annual reports  when 
performing operating and financial reviews (OFRs) of listed companies was highlighted in a report 
aimed at inquiring into the arrangements for financial regulation of public limited companies in the 
UK.103 This ensued from the realisation that traditional financial statements, no matter how well 
                                                 
91 J Gray and  J Hamilton,  Implementing Financial Regulation (2006) 29 
92 Ibid p 30 
93 ibid 
94 ibid 
95 Ibid p 31 
96 ibid 
97 ibid 
98 ibid 
99 Ibid p 47 ; Through the implementation of “consumer protection” and “public awareness” objectives, the 
FSA attempts to portray citizens as proactive and risk-aware consumers who seek the opportunity to secure 
their financial future through participation in financial markets and who accept responsibility for the results 
of the choices they make. 
100 ibid 
101 Ibid p 48 
102 Ibid : Firms will be allowed to fail with resulting consumer loss. 
103  See House of Commons  - Treasury – Minutes  of Evidence , House of Commons Environmental Audit, 
Fourth Report  13 March 2007 Session 2006/2007 < 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200607/cmselect/cmenvaud/227/22702.htm> (last visited 22nd 
August 2007) 
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constructed, would not always provide sufficient information for analysts and investors.104 
As part of the implementation of the Financial Conglomerates Directive, section 25 a (1) was amended 
in the last quarter of 2004.105 The implementation of the European Financial Conglomerates Directive 
into German Law took effect on the 1st Jan 2005 and it requires clearly for a strategy whereby the 
institution's ability to manage risks as part of a proper business organisation is taken into account106. 
The adoption of a risk based approach to financial regulation and supervision in Germany has been 
prompted by the significance of financial conglomerates.107 Financial conglomerates have significant 
influence on financial stability particularly when they have a notable level of market share in several 
financial sectors and gain increasing significance in the market as a result of their size.108 The 
objectives of the Financial Conglomerates Directive interalia includes ensuring the sound supervision 
of additional risks associated with financial groups who are involved in cross-sector financial 
activities.109 It also encourages member states to develop their standards for limits on risk 
concentrations or permit their national supervisors to do so until there is further coordination.110 
The implementation of the EU Financial Conglomerates Directive in Germany considers the growing 
economic importance of financial conglomerates and for the first time, supervisors now have a weapon 
in overcoming risks to the financial system attributed to financial conglomerates.111 The Bundesbank's 
significant involvement in financial conglomerates' reporting enhances its ability to assess risks to 
enterprises within a conglomerate and the risks to financial stability attributed to financial 
conglomerates.112  
 Despite the Bundesbank's involvement, supervisors are still challenged by the fact that sectoral 
supervisory requirements address the relevant risks differently and that there is still no integrated 
approach to cross-sector supervision of equivalent risks.113 Supervisors are therefore still largely 
confining themselves to a form of monitoring that informs them about risk concentrations and intra-
group transactions but does not yet set integrated supervisory upper limits across all sectors - which 
appears reasonable114. 
 
It is therefore important, prior to creating more extensive supervisory standards, to compile 
information and gather experience based on incoming reports. Arrangements to resolve or at least 
disclose conflicts of interest resulting from business activity in different financial sectors have also not 
been reached.115 The focus of the supervision of companies belonging to a financial conglomerate 
remains on individual supervision that is supplemented, but not overrided, by rules governing group-
wide supervision (solo-plus approach).116 
 
 
                                                 
104  ibid 
105 NO Angermueller, M Eichhorn and T Ramke, 'New Standards of Banking Supervision – A Look at the 
German Implementation Approach for the Second Pillar of Basel II'  2005 (2) Journal of International 
Banking Law and Regulation 52; Section 25 (a) deals with  particular organisational duties of institutions 
106  See also Deutsche Bundesbank,  'Supervision of Financial Conglomerates in Germany' Monthly Report 
(April 2005) 39 
107  Ibid p 44 
108  Ibid pp 45,46 
109 Ibid p 48 
110  Ibid p 51,52 
111  Ibid p 55 
112  Ibid ; also see Deutsche Bundesbank,  'The Deutsche Bundesbank's Involvement in Banking Supervision' 
Monthly Report (September 2000) 
113   See Deutsche Bundesbank,  'Supervision of Financial Conglomerates in Germany' Monthly Report (April 
2005)  p 55 
114  ibid 
115  ibid 
116  ibid 
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Has the Approach to Risk-based Regulation influenced the Degree of involvement of External 
Auditors  in Germany?  
Bundesbank and German Financial Supervisory Authority (BaFin): Statistics ongoing banking 
supervision117 
Ongoing banking supervision operations, Number of operations conducted 
Item 2002 2003 2004 
¹ Revised from the previous year. Source: Deutsche Bundesbank 
Individual reports pursuant to sections 13 to 14 of the Banking Act 206 971 
153 
035 
186 
754 
Single borrowers included in the summary reports submitted pursuant to 
sections 13 to 14 of the Banking Act 
2 314 
292 
1 832 
038 
2 126 
336 
Reports pursuant to sections 24 and 24a of the Banking Act 47 585 
44 
561 
47 
002 
Monthly returns pursuant to section 25 and 25a of the Banking Act 42 992 
40 
918 
38 
558 
Reports on the volume of foreign lending (country risk) pursuant to section 
25 (3) of the Banking Act 270 370 912 
Auditors' reports on annual accounts 3 378 3 263 3 253
Reports on the auditing of safe custody accounts 614 483 644 
Routine, special and deposit guarantee fund auditors' reports 1 887 1 755 1 678
Audits pursuant to sections 44 and 44c of the Banking Act 69 79 155 
Auditors' reports on the special funds of investment companies 1 431 1 309 1 459
Reports from investment companies on their activities 6 635 6 891 6 606
Reports under Principle I 32 846 
29 
923 
28 
907 
Reports under Principle II 31 617 
28 
990 
27 
789 
Audits of internal risk models 8 9 6 
Reports under the Capital Accord of the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision 76 76 81 
 
From the statistics on ongoing banking supervision, it can be seen that although auditors' reports on 
annual accounts, routine special and deposit guarantee fund auditors' reports have decreased, audits 
pursuant to sections 44 and 44c of the Banking Act, auditors' reports on the special funds of 
investment companies have increased. Particularly notable is the significant increase in sections 44 
and 44c audits pursuant to the Banking Act. Between 2002 and 2004, these audits have more than 
                                                 
117  Source : <http://www.bundesbank.de/bankenaufsicht/bankenaufsicht_bafin_fenster.en.php> 
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doubled. 
From this, it can be inferred that the adoption of risk based regulation in financial supervision in 
Germany has overall, not resulted to a reduction in its use of external auditors. The growing 
importance of risk-based regulation is also highlighted through risk-oriented reporting as it now 
represents a significant component of standard disclosure requirements and credit institutions must not 
only explain their assets and other elements but also outline their own risk situation and their ability to 
manage these risks.118 The growing importance of using external auditors is also demonstrated through 
the Basel Committee's recommendations119 and certain post Enron reforms.120  It is therefore difficult 
to establish which is of greater importance – whether it is risk-based regulation or the use of external 
auditors.  
 
The Impact of Basel II on German Banking Supervision 
It was expected that the new Basel Capital Accord would result to a shift as on-site prudential 
audits assumed greater importance within the supervisory review process and came to 
supplement the evaluation of reports and returns from institutions.121  This seems to be reflected 
in the above table of statistics on ongoing supervision. Basel II has three pillars namely : Minimum 
capital requirements, supervisory review process and market discipline. Even though the past years 
have concentrated on pillar 1, pillar 2 presents a great challenge for banks and supervisory agencies.122  
In October 1995, following the collapse of Barings Bank, which was attributed to inadequate control 
mechanisms, organisation and risk management, BaFin's predecessor, the Bundesaufsichtsamt fuer das 
Kreditwesen circulated the statement on “minimum requirements for the trading activities of credit 
institutions”.123 BaFin gave an official statement regarding the implementation of Pillar 2 on the 15th 
April 2004.124 The foundation for this is a new circular called MaRisk ( minimum requirements for 
risk management).125   
Pillars 1 and 3 are to be covered by the new solvency directive Solvenzverordnung. Section 10 (1b) of 
the German Banking Act will be amended with regards to pillar 2.126 Pillar 2 not only seeks to ensure 
that banks have adequate capital to support all the risks related to their activities, but also encourages 
banks to develop and implement better risk management techniques in monitoring and managing their 
risks.127 
 
Basel II goes beyond the current German bank regulations – as a result there are not only 
inconsistencies, but also gaps between the regulations.128 When comparing the minimum requirements 
for the credit business of credit institutions (MaK) with Basel II Internal Risk Based approaches, in 
detail, it is evident that requirements for IRB approaches are beyond those of the MaK.129 As a result 
of its higher sophistication, those ratings which fulfil IRB requirements will also fulfill MaK 
                                                 
118  See Deutsche Bundesbank, 'New Transparency Rules for Credit Institutions' Deutsche Bundesbank Monthly 
Report (October 2005) p 69 
119 Basel Committee's Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision and the Relationship between Banking 
Supervisors and Banks' External Auditors , International Auditing Practices Committee 
120  See Deutsche Bundesbank,  'The Evolution of Accounting Standards for Credit Institutions, Deutsche 
Bundesbank Monthly Report (June 2002) p 39 
121 Deutsche Bundesbank, Deutsche Bundesbank's Involvement in Banking Supervision  Monthly Report 
(September 2000) p 37  
122 NO Angermueller, M Eichhorn and T Ramke, 'New Standards of Banking Supervision – A Look at the 
German Implementation Approach for the Second Pillar of Basel II' (2005) 2 Journal of International 
Banking Law and Regulation  45 
123 Ibid p 47 
124 ibid 
125 ibid 
126 Ibid p 52 
127  ibid p 55 
128  ibid  
129  ibid 52 
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requirements but the reverse is not the same.130  
The minimum requirements for risk management ( MaRisk) combines the minimum requirements for 
the credit business of credit institutions (MaK), MaH and MaIR.131 As well as paving way for more 
holistic regulation, this merger should prevent further risk classes specified in the New Basel  Capital 
Accord.132  
 
Italy 
Risk Based Approach to  Bank Supervision in Italy 
Supervisory activities aimed at increasing the capitalisation of banks – particularly major ones and to 
manage their risks of large exposures became more of a regular practice in 2001.133 Methods for 
certifying banks’ internal models for market risk calculation and related capital charges were also 
established.134 
 
The Bank of Italy is taking measures to implement the new Basle Capital Accord.135 In accordance 
with the EU’s Capital Adequacy Directives 2006/48 and 2006/49 on the taking up and pursuit of the 
business of credit institutions and the capital adequacy of investment firms and credit institutions 
respectively, the so-called Basle II capital-adequacy principles will take effect as from January 1st 
2007. The exception will be for financial institutions adopting more sophisticated methods of risk 
calculation, who will be allowed to adopt the principles on January 1st 2008. Although the EU will 
apply Basle rules to all banks and investment firms, and not just to those that are internationally active 
as required by the Basle Accord, a number of adjustments have been made to incorporate EU 
specifications and to make life easier for smaller firms. There are areas where national discretion may 
be exercised. There will be lower capital requirements in the EU rules for banks venture-capital 
business in order not to put excessive dampers on finance for start-ups, given that these are regarded as 
crucial for the future growth and competitiveness of the EU. This directive will introduce a common 
regulatory approach to securitisation across the EU for the first time. The Bank of Italy was still 
consulting with Italian financial institutions as of end-July 2006 on details relating to the Italian 
legislation for the purposes of transposing EU directives into national legislation. 
 
In the area of credit risk, low- and medium-risk investment firms will be able to continue using the 
existing expenditure-based rules for credit risk, though they will have to divide their exposures into a 
larger number of classes. This will be known as the standardised approach. The more sophisticated 
approach for other financial institutions uses the internal ratings-based (IRB) method based on the 
Basel agreement, but will comprise foundation and advanced approaches. Less complex institutions 
will be able to mix the less and more sophisticated methodologies. 
 
There will be similar flexibility in addressing operational risk, consisting of three levels: the basic 
indicator approach, the standardised approach, and the advanced measurement approach 
(AMA)136. These levels reflect the increasing levels of risk sensitivity. The standard definition of 
                                                 
130  ibid pp 52,52 
131  ibid p 54 
132  ibid p 55 
133  See  'Supervision of Banks and Other Intermediaries:  Banking Supervision”, Bank of Italy at p  205 
<http://www.bancaditalia.it/vigilanza_tutela/vig_ban/pubblicazioni/rela/2001/Supervision.pdf> last visited 
Jan 20 2007 
134  ibid 
135  Ibid 
136   The basic approach is founded on a fixed percentage of gross income, the standardised approach extends the 
basic approach by breaking down banks' activities into components' and the advanced measurement approach 
is based on the adoption of banks' internal models. See M Moscadelli, 'The Modelling of Operational Risk: 
Experience with the Analysis of Data collected by the Basel Committee' (July 2004) Banca D'Italia Temi di 
Discussione del Servizio Studi Bank of Italy, Banking Supervision Department Number 517/2004 
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operational risk as agreed to by the Risk Management Group of the Basel Committee and industry 
representatives is “ the risk of loss resulting from inadequate or failed internal processes, people and 
systems or from external events.”137 This definition includes legal risk and excludes strategic and 
reputational risk and depends on the classification of operational risks according to the underlying 
causes138. Other important operational risk issues currently encountered by banks include business-
continuity planning, the role of internal and external audits, the outsourcing of business functions and 
electronic banking.139 Since 2001, the Basel Committee's Risk Management Group has been carrying 
out surveys of banks' operational loss data with the aim of obtaining information on the sector's 
operational risk experience and also with a view to refining the capital framework.140 The Bank of 
Italy checked the state of preparedness of Italy’s eight largest banking groups in 2005 and concluded 
that management was well aware of the imminence of the changes and that statistical systems were 
adequate. However, it identified a need for improvements in the quality of data and in IT systems for 
modelling. 
 
There will be a single consolidating supervisor through which cross border groups will channel 
applications to use the IRB and AMA methodologies. Decisions will be made within six months by 
the different supervisors acting together. 
 
The US 
Risk Based Supervision in the US 
The Federal Reserve also operates according to a risk-focussed method of supervision which was 
adopted not only as a result of the ever growing size and complexity of banks, but also because of the 
continuity inherent in its nature – as opposed to a point-in-time examination.141 The risk based 
approach was also introduced following the 'savings and loans' debacle of the late 1980s and 1990s.142 
The risk-based supervision process aims to ascertain the greatest risks to a banking organisation and 
evaluate the ability of the organisation’s management to identify, measure, monitor and control those 
risks.143 Businesses which have the potential to produce the greatest risks form the main focus of 
examination carried out by Federal Reserve examiners.144 The risk management component consists of 
four sub components which indicate the effectiveness of the banking organisation’s risk management 
and controls namely: Board and senior management oversight; Policies, procedures and limits; Risk 
monitoring management information systems and  Internal controls.145 According to Alan Greenspan, 
a combination of improved risk management and the utilisation of financial derivatives to manage the 
risk portfolio has enabled banks to calculate risks more efficiently in business, which in turn has 
resulted to a reduction of the burden of the banking system on its regulators.146 
The move towards a risk-based approach is an attempt to realign bank regulation and supervision with 
the commercial realities faced by banks and this involved institutions managing their risks in a more 
efficient way to reflect the increase in modes of obtaining finance for business and also to hedge 
risks.147 The risk based approach in the USA concentrates on both small 'community banks' and 'large 
banks' and the mode of supervision has developed in distinct ways as a result of the existence of more 
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than one bank regulator at the federal level.148 
The risk based approach consolidates on the extent to which a risk could adversely affect the safety 
and soundness of a bank.149 Benefits of the OCC's risk based approach include:150 Core assessment 
criteria which assist the OCC in its application of a common methodology to evaluate the risk profile 
of individual group entities to ensure that risks can be measured consistently and ; the forward looking 
and proactive nature of the OCC's approach which enables it to gauge how risks will change over the 
next 12 months. 
 
Impact of Basel II on US Financial Regulation and Supervision 
Basel II is important not only because it is a common standard for measuring capital adequacy but also 
because it is based on the risks of an institution’s investments.151 It therefore allows for greater 
facilitation of harmonisation and easier comparisons between different countries, particularly at a time 
when globalisation and the increase of multinational firms has made this necessary. The risk based 
capital standards not only mandate institutions that assume greater risk to have higher levels of capital 
but also take into consideration risks associated with operations that are not included on a bank’s 
balance sheet, such as those risks resulting from obligations to make loans.152 Basel II has been 
pursued by the Federal Reserve due to the increasing inadequacies of Basel I regulatory capital rules 
particularly in the context of the growing complexity of products and services provided by large 
internationally active banks.153 A more risk-capital framework has been called for and it is believed 
that Basel II would provide such framework for such internationally active banks.154 As banking 
involves the acceptance and management of risks, it is of great importance that bank supervisors  
ensure that an adequate level of capital is maintained to insulate itself against potential losses. 
Minimum regulatory capital requirements are vital to ensuring that such protection is facilitated.155 
 
On the 25th of September, 2006, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Treasury (OCC); 
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Board); Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
(FDIC); and Office of Thrift Supervision, Treasury (OTS), which are collectively known as the 
Agencies, issued a notice of proposed rule making ( NPR or proposed rule).156 This notice welcomes 
comments on the New Advanced Capital Adequacy Framework that will replace the present general 
risk-based capital standards which have been applied to large, internationally active US banks.157 The 
proposed framework would also implement the “International Convergence of Capital Measurement 
and Capital Standards : A Revised Framework,” which was published in June 2004 by the Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision (Basel II) in the US.158  Basel II consists of three pillars namely: 
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capital adequacy requirements, centralized supervision and market discipline. 
 
In relation to Pillar 1, the proposed framework as described in the NPR, would require some 
qualifying banks and permit others to calculate their regulatory risk-based capital requirements using 
an internal ratings-based (IRB) approach for credit risk and the advanced measurement approaches 
(AMA) for operational risk.159 As well as giving guidelines for the supervisory review process and 
requiring a process for the supervisory review of capital adequacy under Pillar 2, the NPR also 
highlights requirements for improved public disclosures under Pillar 3.160 
 
Three documents lay out the proposed supervisory guidance for implementing proposed revisions to 
the risk-based capital standards in the US and this new capital framework would be compulsory for 
large internationally active US banking organisations and optional for other institutions.161 Two of 
these documents relate to the Basel II advanced approaches for calculating risk-based capital 
requirements namely, the advanced internal ratings-based (IRB) approach for credit risk and the 
advanced measurement approaches (AMA) for operational risk.162 Under the IRB framework, internal 
estimates of certain risk components would be used as key inputs by banks in determining their 
regulatory risk-based capital requirement for credit risk.163 As well as updating and consolidating 
previously proposed supervisory guidance on corporate and retail exposures, the IRB Guidance also 
provides new guidance on systems which a bank may require in order to distinguish risks posed by 
other types of credit exposure.164 
 
The second guidance document provides supervisory guidance on the AMA for operational risk and 
updates the proposed AMA Guidance published in 2003.165 The third document, issued for the first 
time, sets out proposals for guidance on the Basel II supervisory review process for assessing capital 
adequacy.166 
 
Conclusion 
Meta Risk regulation: The Way Forward? 
 
Compliance will always remain vital in determining the success of meta regulation. In order to ensure 
the least deviation between what is expected of a firm and its actual compliance with rules, the issue of 
monitoring will therefore, be crucial. Whilst enforced self regulation (a form of meta regulation), 
provides the benefits of flexibility derived from self regulation, it also attempts to avoid the 
weaknesses of its voluntary nature. In considering more ambiguous factors such as the external 
environment of the firm, the risk based approach to supervision would appear to produce less accurate 
results than meta regulation. Furthermore its impact on the use of external auditors, as illustrated by 
the Financial  Services Authority (FSA), contributes to its being a less favorable option than meta 
regulation.  
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